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Chapter 4. Security |
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Nowadays, databases are cardinal components of any web based application by enabling
websites to provide varying dynamic content. Since very sensitive or secret informations can be
stored in such database, you should strongly consider to protect them somehow.
To retrieve or to store any information you need to connect to the database, send a
legitimate query, fetch the result, and close the connecion. Nowadays, the commonly used interface
in the interaction with databases is the Structured Query Language (SQL). See how an attacker can
tamper with an SQL query.
As you can realize, PHP cannot protect your database by itself. The following sections aim
to be an introduction into the very basics of how to access and manipulate databases within PHP
scripts.
Keep in my mind this simple rule: defence in depth. In the more place you take the more
action to increase the protection of your database, the less probability of that an attacker
succeeds, and exposes or abuse any stored secret information. Good design of the database schema
and the application deals with your greatest fears.
The first step is always to create the database, unless you want to use an existing third
party's one. When a database is created, it is assigned to an owner, who executed the creation
statement. Usually, only the owner (or a superuser) can do anything with the objects in that
database, and in order to allow other users to use it, privileges must be granted.
Applications should never connect to the database as its owner or a superuser, because
these users can execute any query at will, for example, modifying the schema (e.g. dropping tables)
or deleting its entire content.
You may create different database users for every aspect of your application with very
limited rights to database objects. The most required privileges should be granted only, and avoid
that the same user can interact with the database in different use cases. This means that if
intruders gain access to your database using one of these credentials, they can only effect as many
changes as your application can.
You are encouraged not to implement all the business logic in the web application (i.e.
your script), instead to do it in the database schema using views, triggers or rules. If the system
evolves, new ports will be intended to open to the database, and you have to reimplement the logic
in each separate database client. Over and above, triggers can be used to transparently and
automatically handle fields, which often provides insight when debugging problems with your
application or tracing back transactions.
You may want to estabilish the connections over SSL to encrypt client/server
communications for increased security, or you can use ssh to encrypt the network connection between
clients and the database server. If either of them is done, then monitoring your traffic and
gaining informations in this way will be a hard work.
SSL/SSH protects data traveling from the client to the server, SSL/SSH does not protect
the persistent data stored in a database. SSL is an on-the-wire protocol.
Once an attacker gains access to your database directly (bypassing the webserver), the
stored sensitive data may be exposed or misused unless, the information is protected by the
database itself. Encrypting the data is a good way to mitigate this threat, but very few databases
offer this type of data encryption.
The easiest way to work around this problem is to first create your own encryption
package, and then use it from within your PHP scripts. PHP can assist you in this case with its
several extensions, such as Mcrypt and
Mhash, covering a wide variety of encryption algorithms. The script encrypts the data be stored
first, and decrypts it when retrieving. See the references for further examples how encryption
works.
In case of truly hidden data, if its raw representation is not needed (i.e. not be
displayed), hashing may be also taken into consideration. The well-known example for the hashing is
storing the MD5 hash of a password in a database, instead of the password itself. See also crypt() and md5().
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Example 4-5. Using hashed password field
// storing password hash
$query = sprintf("INSERT INTO users(name,pwd) VALUES('%s','%s');",
addslashes($username), md5($password));
$result = pg_exec($connection, $query);
// querying if user submitted the right password
$query = sprintf("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE name='%s' AND pwd='%s';",
addslashes($username), md5($password));
$result = pg_exec($connection, $query);
if (pg_numrows($result) > 0) {
echo "Wellcome, $username!";
}
else {
echo "Authentication failed for $username.";
}
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Many web developers are unaware of how SQL queries can be tampered with, and assume that
an SQL query is a trusted command. It means that SQL queries are able to circumvent access
controls, thereby bypassing standard authentication and authorization checks, and sometimes SQL
queries even may allow access to host operating system level commands.
Direct SQL Command Injection is a technique where an attacker creates or alters existing
SQL commands to expose hidden data, or to override valuable ones, or even to execute dangerous
system level commands on the database host.
This is accomplished by the application taking user input and combining it with static
parameters to build a SQL query. The following examples are based on true stories,
unfortunately.
Owing to the lack of input validation and connecting to the database on behalf of a
superuser or the owner who can create users, the attacker may create a superuser in your
database.
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Example 4-6. Splitting the result set into pages ... and making superusers (PostgreSQL and
MySQL)
$offset = argv[0]; // beware, no input validation!
$query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;";
$result = pg_exec($conn, $query);
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Normal users click on the 'next', 'prev' links where the $offset is encoded into the URL.
The script expects that the incoming $offset is decimal number. However, someone tries to
break in with appending urlencode()'d form of the
following to the URL (PostgreSQL):
0;
insert into pg_shadow(usename,usesysid,usesuper,usecatupd,passwd)
values ('crack', 31, 't','t','crack');
--
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or more precisely:
0;
insert into pg_shadow(usename,usesysid,usesuper,usecatupd,passwd)
select 'crack', usesysid, 't','t','crack'
from pg_shadow where usename='postgres';
--
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or in case of using MySQL:
0;
UPDATE user SET Password=PASSWORD('crack') WHERE user='root';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
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If it happened, then the script would present a superuser access to him. Note that 0; is
to supply a valid offset to the original query and to terminate it.
Note: It is common technique to force the SQL parser to ignore the rest of the query
written by the developer with -- which is the comment sign in SQL.
A feasible way to gain passwords:
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Example 4-7. Listing out articles ... and some passwords (any database server)
$query = "SELECT id, name, inserted, size FROM products WHERE size = '$size';";
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The static part of the query can be combined with another SELECT statement which reveals
all passwords:
union select '1', concat(uname||'-'||passwd) as name, '1971-01-01', '0' from usertable
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If this query were assigned to $size (prepended with '), the query beast
awakened.
SQL UPDATEs are also subject to attacking your database.
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Example 4-8. From resetting a password ... to gaining more privileges (any database
server)
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='$pwd' WHERE uid='$uid';";
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But a malicious user sumbits the value ' or uid like'%admin%'; -- to $uid, and
the query will be twisted:
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='...' WHERE uid='' or like '%admin%'; --";
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Now, the admin user password has been changed. Alternatively, the attacker simply sets
$pwd to "hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 (with a trailing space) to gain more
privileges:
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 WHERE ...;"
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A frightening example how operating system level commands can be accessed on some database
hosts.
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Example 4-9. Attacking the database host's operating system (MSSQL Server)
$query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%$prod%'";
$result = mssql_query($query);
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If attacker submits the value a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD'
-- to $prod, then the $query will be:
$query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD'--";
$result = mssql_query($query);
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MSSQL Server executes the SQL statements in the batch including a command to add a new user to the
local accounts database. If this application were running as sa and the MSSQLSERVER
service is running with sufficient privileges, the attacker would now have an account with which to
access this machine.
Note: Some of the examples above is tied to a specific database server. This does not
mean that a similar attack is impossible against other products. Your database server may be so
vulnerable in other manner.
You may plead that the attacker must possess a piece of information about the database
schema in most examples. You are right, but you never know when and how it can be taken out, and if
it happens, your database may be exposed. If you are using an open source, or publicly available
database handling package, which may belong to a content management system or forum, the intruders
easily produce a copy of a piece of your code. It may be also a security risk if it is a poorly
designed one.
These attacks are mainly based on exploiting the code not being written with security in
mind. Never trust on any kind of input, especially which comes from the client side. The first
example shows that such a blameless query can cause disasters.
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First, check if the given input has the expected data type. PHP has a wide range of input
validating functions, from the simplest ones found in Variable
Functions and in Character Type Functions sections, (e.g. is_numeric(),
ctype_digit() respectively) onwards the Perl compatible Regular
Expressions support.
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If the application waits for numeric input, consider to verify data with is_numeric(), or silently change its type using settype() or sprintf()().
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Example 4-10. A more secure way to compose a query for paging
settype($order, 'integer');
$query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;";
// please note %d in the format string, using %s would be meaningless
$query = sprintf("SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET %d;", $offset);
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Quote user input which is passed to the database with
addslashes() or addcslashes(). See this example. As the examples shows,
quotes burnt into the static part of the query is not enough, and can be easily hacked.
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Do not print out any database specific information, especially about the schema, no matter
what happens. See also Error Reporting and Error Handling and Logging Functions.
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You may use stored procedures and previously defined cursors to abstract data access so
that users do not directly access tables or views, but this solution has another impacts.
Besides these, you benefit from logging queries either within your script or by the
database itself, if it supports. Obviously, the logging is unable to prevent any harmful attempt,
but it can be helpful to trace back which application has been circumvented. The log is not useful
by itself, but through the information it contains. The more detail is generally better.
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